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R E S U LT S
Key Points
· Foundations that work on national public policy 
issues face challenges in demonstrating impact.
· This case study of how the Robert Wood John-
son Foundation’s initiative to support choice of 
program provider for developmentally disabled 
adults uses some advanced statistical techniques 
to demonstrate the impact of the foundation’s 
funding.
· This study suggests that to get the greatest 
impact on policy change, foundations should 
consider offering modest competitive grants to 
governmental departments; spending the funds in 
regional groupings; and focus on jurisdictions that 
have demonstrated interest in the policy area by 
spending their own funds.
Introduction
How can foundations measure the impact   
they have on public policies nationwide?  
Many foundations require that their grantees 
conduct program evaluations on the activities 
they fund; some aggregate these to explore their 
impact. But is it possible to measure the impact 
that funding in just a few states can have on 
policies all across the nation? This case study 
offers a template for achieving this goal and 
observations about how foundations can best 
target their investments, given these empirical 
findings.
Background
Who should choose residential and day program 
providers for adults with developmental disabili-
ties? This is an important question, though one 
that rarely gets media attention. About 3.5 million 
adults in the United States have intellectual or 
developmental disabilities (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2003; U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2000). Many reside with their families 
and receive no state-funded services. But more 
than 400,000 do receive support through services 
provided with state and federal assistance that 
exceeded $38 billion in 2005 alone (Braddock, 
Hemp, Rizzolo, et al., 2005).
Service provision for adults with developmental 
disabilities has changed substantially over the past 
40 years. Through the 1970s, government-funded 
services were provided almost exclusively in large 
state residential institutions. In that decade, how-
ever, tremendous changes began. Federal class-
action lawsuits were used to advance the idea 
that people living in institutions were, in effect, 
being incarcerated without having been convicted 
of committing a crime. These suits forced states 
to provide services in community settings for at 
least some of their citizens with developmental 
disabilities. At the same time, Congress adopted 
changes in the Medicaid program that eventu-
ally made it possible for some federal funding to 
support adults with developmental disabilities 
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A movement emerged favoring 
self-determination for adults with 
developmental disabilities, and 
further Medicaid changes made  
it possible.
in programs outside the state institutions. By 
the early 1990s, a movement emerged favoring 
self-determination for adults with developmental 
disabilities, and further Medicaid changes made it 
possible, in theory, for adults with developmental 
disabilities to select their care providers. This was 
not common, however; in 1992, 42 states contin-
ued to mandate who the service provider would 
be for every individual who received government-
funded services (Breihan, 2007).
One foundation supported self-determination as 
public policy. In 1993, the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation (RWJF) offered limited assistance 
to one region of New Hampshire to fund a trial 
effort permitting adults with developmental dis-
abilities to choose their own service providers. 
This was followed three years later with a national 
request for funding proposals (RFP) for the 
Initiative for Self-Determination for People with 
Developmental Disabilities, offering funding that 
would cover some states’ pilot projects to provide 
greater consumer choice of provider for groups 
of adults with developmental disabilities. This 
research tracks the impact that RWJ Foundation 
had on this issue from 1993 to 2004, when all but 
nine states offered some adults with developmen-
tal disabilities the opportunity to choose their 
service provider.
Foundations have been exhorted to use their re-
sources to have a strategic impact in social justice 
and other public policy areas (Bailin, 2003; Ferris 
& Mintrom, 2002; Stauber, 2001; Weissert, 1995). 
Substantial research has been done about the 
patterns of adult developmental disability service 
provision and funding and about state policy in-
novation patterns for high visibility issues (Gray, 
1973; Lakin, Prouty, Polister, & Smith, 2002; Lowi, 
1964; Mintrom, 1997; Nice, 1997; Polister, Smith, 
Lakin, Prouty, & Smith, 2002; Sapat, 2004; Walker, 
1969). Much literature exists about the impor-
tance of adults with developmental disabilities 
being able to make personal choices in basic 
decisions, such as where they will live. However, 
little empirical work has been presented at the 
intersection of these perspectives. This work ad-
dresses that gap by offering an empirical analysis 
of the impact of RWJF on the spread of increased 
consumer choice of service provider across the 
U.S. for young adults transitioning into adult 
developmental disabilities services.
Methodology
This study took place in two stages. The first part 
was to determine whether there really was a wide-
spread change in the policy of states or whether 
change was restricted to a modest proportion of 
states, perhaps some of the group that received 
some funding from the RWJF. The second step 
was to analyze each state in detail to ascertain 
what factors could predict if and when that state 
would change its public policy. The only way to 
determine the impact of foundation funding was 
to also consider the other possible predictors.
Determining the Level of Choice (the Dependent 
Variable)
The first step in the analysis was determining 
whether choice of service provider was offered 
to new recipients of developmental disabilities 
funding in each state. The study focused on young 
adults transitioning from the educational system 
to residential services outside their parental home 
and/or day program services, because they are 
the new funding recipients the state can plan for 
in advance, given that they have been identified 
through the schools.
Telephone surveys of directors of the states’ 
departments overseeing services for adults with 
developmental disabilities were the source of 
information about the level of choice of provider 
offered to transitioning young adults. I asked the 
state respondent who determines the selection of 
care provider for each transitioning individual. If 
the response was that the transitioning individual 
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makes the choice, I followed up to determine the 
year that policy was initiated. The states were very 
cooperative; in every case the state director or 
that person’s designee provided the information. 
Based on the responses to the survey, each state 
is coded for each of the years from 1992 to 2002. 
One of the complications of the study is that most 
states have different ways of determining who the 
service provider will be, based on disability, geo-
graphical region, and other factors. For this study, 
then, each state is coded for each year based on 
whether any substantial number of transitioning 
individuals could choose their provider. For those 
in which individuals were told which service 
provider to use, the level of choice was coded as 
“state-mandated.” If individuals had the opportu-
nity to choose the provider, whether the provider 
had to be taken from a list of preapproved alter-
natives or whether individuals were free to choose 
almost any provider (excluding spouses, for exam-
ple), without being limited to a preapproved list, I 
considered this to be “consumer choice.”
Investigating the Predictors of Consumer Choice 
(Independent Variables)
To determine which factors to analyze in addition 
to foundation funding, I developed models based 
on four types of possible predictors of innovation. 
These included predictors representing
State adult developmental disabilities policy in •	
service delivery and funding-level patterns.
Specific characteristics of each state, ranging •	
from socio-economic measures to demand 
levels and interest group activity to partisan 
orientation. 
Region and trends among neighboring states.•	
Impact of national influences. •	
Figure 1 illustrates this overall conceptual frame-
work. The variables are described in greater detail 
in Appendix A.
Level of Choice in Day and/or Residential Service Provider Offered by States  
to Adults with Intellectual/Developmental Disabilities
Level of Choice 
of Service 
Provider Offered 
by States to 
Adults with DD
Variables Indicating 
National Influences
· Federal demonstration 
projects participation 
· Private sector 
foundation 
demonstration 
projects participation 
· Combined private-
federal demonstration 
project participation 
Regional Variable
· CMS region influence 
Variables Linked to State 
Adult DD Policy
· Community setting service 
provision 
  · Community census 
 · Community residential 
funding 
· Litigation 
· Service delivery patterns
  · Supply of community beds 
  · Supply of institutional beds 
· Funding levels
 · Medicaid programmatic 
spending 
  · Total adult DD fiscal effort 
 · Supported Employment 
spending effort 
 · Supported Living spending 
effort 
Internal Variables 
· Socio-economic
  · Wealth 
  · Population size 
  · Race/ Ethnicity
  · Urbanization 
  · SSI – D
· State interest group 
· Ideological orientation 
· Electoral politics
  · Democratic governor 
  · Democratic legislature 
  · Electoral cycle 
FIGURE 1 Conceptual Framework
Empirical Evidence for Foundation Impact on Public Policy
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This pattern suggests that the 
innovation of offering individual 
choice was emerging steadily as a 
national trend, one that accelerated 
after RWJF began offering grants in 
this field.
Conducting the Statistical Analysis
The statistical technique used is more compli-
cated than the usual linear regression models 
due to the wealth of information I was able to 
collect. Instead of having a random sample to test 
to see whether the data were representative of 
the whole, I had the data for all the variables for 
every state. In addition, this was not a one-time 
snapshot of the impact of the RWJ Foundation’s 
program, but rather an exploration of states’ 
actions across 11 years. Ironically, having all this 
data meant that I had to use a fairly unusual tech-
nique to analyze what was happening.
The empirical analysis tool was the pooled cross-
sectional time-series technique of event history 
analysis, adapted from the work of Berry and 
Berry (1992). The analysis of factors associated 
with state adoption of choice entails a set of fixed 
effects linear probability models. This approach 
has the advantage of letting the analyst combine 
all the differences among the states that could im-
pact policymaking — but that cannot be captured 
adequately by any practical number of indepen-
dent variables — into one “unobserved effect” 
variable for each year of the study. In the fixed ef-
fects model, each year offers a new coefficient and 
a new average idiosyncratic change in the states 
(Wooldridge, 2003). This enabled me to consider 
whether the states were becoming more similar or 
more different over the 11-year span of the study. 
Unfortunately, gaining this advantage has a disad-
vantage: Independent variables that are constant 
over each of the series of 11 annual observations 
are “swept away” by the fixed effects transforma-
tion (Wooldridge, 2003). For example, maybe the 
size of the state interest group in this policy area 
has an impact on change that would be interest-
ing to examine. But the size of the interest group 
(the Arc, formerly the Association for Retarded 
Citizens) in most states did not change very much 
during each year 1992 through 2002. This means 
that “interest group” drops out as a separate vari-
able in this model. The impact of the size of the 
group still shows up in the yearly dummy variable, 
but it cannot be tracked separately.
In the fixed effects linear probability model, I also 
used three alternate specifications. In the first I 
used all my independent variables. In the second, 
I looked at all the variables except region (per-
centage of the states in the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services [CMS] region offering 
choice). In the third specification, I omitted both 
the dummy variables for year and the variable for 
region. I did this so that interesting results would 
not be overwhelmed and so not appear significant 
when compared with the first two most important 
variables.
Results
The number of states offering choice of residential 
services provider to young adults transitioning 
to adult developmental disabilities services grew 
from eight in 1992, the first year in which federal 
Medicaid funds could be used for noninstitu-
tional residential placements, to 41 in 2004. This 
considerable change occurred without any federal 
mandate (Figure 2).
The spread of consumer choice was analyzed 
using an event history model of outcomes with 
time-varying covariates. As noted in the Method-
ology section, this means that variables demon-
strating only limited variation within the time 
period studied for individual states cannot be 
analyzed usefully in a fixed effects model. Due 
to these impacts of the data structure, I used the 
fixed effects linear probability model to exam-
ine all the states using three specifications: the 
first with all the variables, the second excluding 
region, and the third excluding both region and 
the annual dummy variables. My reasoning was 
that the very strong results for region might be 
obscuring other, lesser but still important rela-
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tionships. When region was excluded, more years’ 
annual dummy variables emerged as significant. I 
wanted to have some sense of the relative impor-
tance of the other variables, so I used the model 
yet again, excluding both region and the annual 
dummy variables. See Appendix B for the table of 
results.
Specification 1: All Independent Variables
When the fixed effects model is used with all the 
variables, the percentage of states in the CMS re-
gion offering choice emerges as significant at the 
0.001 level, as shown in Appendix B. This means 
that states followed the lead of their neighbors in 
their region (but not necessarily adjacent states). 
For each 10 percent increase in states offering in-
dividual choice in the region, the probability of a 
given state offering individual choice increases by 
7 percent (coefficient of 0.700) by 2002, compared 
with the base year of 1992.
Specification 2: All Independent Variables 
Except Region
Were any other predictors important in addi-
tion to region? When “region” is eliminated, the 
dummy variables for the years from 1995 to 2002 
are all significant. In addition, the coefficient for 
each year is larger than that for the previous year. 
This pattern suggests that the innovation of of-
fering individual choice was emerging steadily as 
a national trend, one that accelerated after RWJF 
began offering grants in this field.
Specification 3: All Independent Variables 
Except Region and Year
When the fixed effects model is used without 
the “region” or “year,” three of the remaining 
variables emerge as significant and powerful. The 
most important of these was foundation funding. 
Participation in the RWJF-funded pilot projects 
increased by 18 percent the estimated likelihood 
that a state would offer consumer choice, com-
pared with what would be expected without this 
participation (coefficient of 0.183).
Two variables associated with funding for adult 
developmental disabilities programming also 
emerged. The first significant variable represented 
funding for adult developmental disabilities 
programming in proportion to state wealth. In 
other words, if a state spent relatively more on 
programs for developmentally disabled persons, it 
was about 17 percent more likely to offer con-
sumer choice (coefficient of 0.175). The second, 
the “ratio of state to federal community residen-
tial funding” has a significant negative coefficient. 
This indicates that for each 10 percent increase 
in the ratio of states spending their own money 
FIGURE 2 Choice Offered by States 1992–2004
Empirical Evidence for Foundation Impact on Public Policy
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This is an issue that almost 
never reaches the front pages of 
newspapers or the blogosphere.
rather than federal funds, states were 5 percent 
less likely to offer individual choice (coefficient 
−0.0513; see Appendix B for the table of results).
Implications
Quantitative Measurement of the Impact of 
Foundation Initiatives on Policy Is Possible
This approach to developing a quantitative mea-
sure of foundation impact on a policy area across 
the U.S. has some limitations but is largely practi-
cal. This study demonstrates that program evalu-
ators can quantify the impact of the foundation’s 
funding decisions. For the many policy areas in 
which foundations are involved that are not “hot 
button” issues, this model demonstrates that it 
is possible to prove impact empirically, bearing 
in mind that one needs high-quality information 
about the actions the states actually take. It is 
important to remember that this case study looks 
at an issue that is important to many of our most 
vulnerable citizens and one that involves billions 
of dollars. However, this is an issue that almost 
never reaches the front pages of newspapers or 
the blogosphere. The results are likely to be very 
different for issues that are highly politicized, 
issues in which the numbers of forces influencing 
the debate may be beyond what a program evalu-
ator can truly capture.
Practical Suggestions for Effective Public Policy 
Grantmaking
The findings of this study suggest some practical 
guidelines for foundations that wish to achieve 
the greatest possible impact for their funding 
dollar in terms of influencing government policy 
across the U.S.
First, consider following the strategy of RWJF in 
this case study. Offer competitive grants to the 
relevant civil service departments, especially if 
they are not at the forefront of political debate. 
The impact this approach had is, if anything, 
underreflected in the statistical results. When I 
interviewed the directors of developmental dis-
abilities departments in each state, many told me 
they were very much aware of RWJF funding and 
felt that this initiative was a real indication that 
individual choice, not state mandates, was the 
coming trend. Several shared that they felt their 
state was not in a position to make a credible 
application for RWJF funding, but they were very 
interested in following the results of the states 
in their region that did receive the funds; these 
directors said this was the direction they wanted 
to pursue, too, in the near future.
The financial outlay for this RWJF initiative was 
relatively modest. Over the life of the project, 
only about $5 million was spent. The largest 
state awards were in the range of $400,000 over 
two or three years, even though the average state 
funding for adult disabilities services in 2002 
was in excess of $250,000,000. This tremendous 
impact suggests that department heads may well 
be willing to make major policy changes, given 
relatively small amounts of seed money to try 
the innovation.
Though this case study is based on policy innova-
tion at the state level, foundations should consider 
this approach at other levels of government as 
well. County or municipal departments could 
be offered the opportunity to compete for funds 
to try policy changes, assuming the application 
process was sufficiently painless.
Second, resist the temptation to fund states scat-
tered across the country. Rather, based on the 
findings from this study, states are more likely to 
“follow the pack” in their own region (a region 
based on the funding patterns of the federal 
government for the policy area, in this case CMS, 
even over a measure of contiguity). In this study, 
the proportion of states in the region that offered 
choice was a strong, significant predictor of what 
a given state would choose to do the following 
year. In other words, focus your funding on a re-
gional basis to build up momentum for the policy 
you wish to encourage.
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States that already have made 
substantial investment in the policy 
area you care about will be easier 
to motivate to try your innovation, 
even though they do not follow your 
preferred policy currently.
This does not mean that foundations should fund 
all the states in a given region. In New England, for 
example, smaller states (the first with RWJF fund-
ing) offered choice first. Massachusetts, the largest 
state in New England, was the last to make the 
change, but it did follow the lead of its neighbors in 
relatively few years. The same pattern was followed 
in the Midwest (CMS Region 7), where Nebraska 
and Kansas offered choice early on, and Iowa and 
Missouri followed suit within a few years.
Third, begin with states that have demonstrated 
a real interest in the policy area that interests you 
before you ever issue an RFP. States that spent 
more for adult developmental disabilities services 
in proportion to the state’s total personal income 
were significantly more likely to offer choice 
earlier. This suggests that, all other things being 
equal, states that already have made substantial 
investment in the policy area you care about will 
be easier to motivate to try your innovation, even 
though they do not follow your preferred policy 
currently. And, based on the regional momentum 
finding mentioned previously, their making the 
change will increase the chances that their neigh-
bors will follow suit.
What, then, does not matter? The states that usu-
ally are considered the trendsetters were not early 
adopters of choice in this case study. California 
was one of the last to make the change. Variables 
representing electoral politics were not signifi-
cant. Having a liberal governor did not make 
any significant difference. Foundations, then, 
may benefit from re-evaluating the states they 
frequently fund first.
In sum, empirical evaluations of the impact of 
foundation funding on public policy really can be 
achieved. This study offers a model for making 
this assessment in an important area that receives 
little publicity. Additional studies in other policy 
areas would be valuable to hone this model 
further.
To get the greatest impact for their investment 
in (non-hot button) policy change, foundations 
should consider offering modest competitive 
grants to governmental departments. All other 
things being equal, foundations should spend 
the funds in regional groupings, not scattered 
throughout the U.S. The funding should be 
focused on jurisdictions that have demonstrated 
interest in the policy area by spending their own 
funds. This indicator is more important than a 
state’s general reputation for innovation.
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Predictors of state adult developmental disabilities policy in service delivery  
and funding-level patterns
· Community residential census (the number of persons with developmental disabilities [DD] residing 
with state funding in settings with 15 or fewer persons divided by the number of persons in the total 
population, in thousands).
· Medicaid waivers spending effort (federal and state Medicaid waiver funding for services to adults 
with DD divided by the total state personal income, multiplied by 1,000)
· Total DD spending effort (the level of spending for all adult DD services per $1,000 state personal 
income)
· Ratio of state to federal community residential funding (the level of state funding for community-based 
residential programs for adults with DD divided by federal funding for community-based residential 
programs)
· Supported employment spending effort (spending on supported employment, per $1,000 state per-
sonal income)
· Supported living and personal assistance spending effort (spending on supported living and personal 
assistants, per $1,000 state personal income)
Note. These variable choices were influenced by  Braddock et al., unpublished data, 2002; Braddock and Fujiura, 1987; 
Braddock, Hemp, Parish, et al., 2000; Garrett, 2002; Grogan, 1994,; McGaughey & Mank, 2001; Parish, 2001; Sigelman, 
Roeder, & Sigelman, 1981.
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Individual characteristics of each state
· Percentage population Hispanic
· Percentage of population living in urban areas
· SSI-Disability funded census per total population
· ARC membership per population (The Arc, formerly the Association for Retarded Citizens is the prin-
cipal advocacy group for persons with developmental disabilities nationwide.)
· Liberal (This score was derived by averaging the scores given to each member of the congressional 
delegation of the state for each year by the Americans for Democratic Action [ADA]. The ADA ratings 
for each federal legislator is recorded on the ADA Web site. The scores for each state for both parties 
are then weighted on the basis of the partisan composition to the state legislatures.)
· Democratic governor
· Election year (This lagged variable is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if it is the year after an 
election year for the governorship and 0 if it is not.
Note. These variable choices were influenced by Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Berry & Berry, 1990, 1992; Braddock & Fujiura, 
1991; Buchanan, Cappellini, & Ohsfeldt, 1991; DiLeo, 2001; Elazar, 1984; Gray, 1973; Harrington, Carrillo, Wellin, Miller, & 
LeBlanc, 2000; Heclo, 1978; Jacoby & Schneider, 2001; Ka & Teske, 2002; Kingdon, 1995; Lowi, 1964; Mohr, 1969; Mooney 
& Lee, 1995; Rigby, Brooks-Gunn, & Kagan, 2004; Sapat, 2004; Schneider, 1993; Schneider & Jacoby, 1996; Walker, 1969; 
Walker, 1983. 
Region and trends among neighboring states
· Percentage of the states in the CMS (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) region offering 
choice
Note. This variable choice was influenced by Berry & Berry, 1990; Daley & Garand, 2002; Glick & Hays, 1991; Jacoby & 
Schneider, 2001; Lutz, 1989; Mooney, 2001; Mooney & Lee, 1995; Rogers, 1995; Sharkansky, 1969. 
National influences
· Number of federally funded demonstration projects (This lagged variable denotes the number of fed-
eral demonstration projects related to consumer choice that the state participated in before the year 
in question. These include community supported living arrangements (CSLA); programs in the eight 
states of California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin; and 
the Florida 115 Demonstration authorizing an Independence Plus waiver.)
· Number of Robert Wood Johnson Foundation-funded demonstration projects (This lagged variable 
expresses the number of times that the state participated in a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
consumer choice demonstration project before the year in question. This includes the initial fund-
ing for New Hampshire from 1993 to 1996, beginning with the Monadnock Developmental Services 
project and the National Initiative on Self-Determination for Persons with Developmental Disabilities, 
funded in 18 additional states in 1997.
· Cash and Counseling Demonstration Project (This lagged variable records whether states participat-
ed in the foundation and federal demonstration grant program, sponsored jointly by the Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation in the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services.)
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Variables
Specification 1:  
All variables 
(standard error)
Specification 2: 
Excluding CMS region  
(standard error)
Specification 3: 
Excluding CMS  
region and year  
(standard error)
Year 1993 0.00963 (0.059) 0.0186 (0.061)
Year 1994 0.0651 (0.061) 0.0908 (0.063)
Year 1995 0.0703 (0.062) 0.166** (0.064)
Year 1996 0.0416 (0.069) 0.198** (0.067)
Year 1997 0.102 (0.073) 0.288*** (0.070)
Year 1998 0.109 (0.077) 0.341*** (0.071)
Year 1999 0.146 (0.082) 0.432*** (0.072)
Year 2000 0.145 (0.087) 0.475*** (0.074)
Year 2001 0.175* (0.089) 0.503*** (0.077)
Year 2002 0.198* (0.097) 0.554*** (0.083)
Developmental 
disabilities policy 
variables
Supported employment 
spending effort 
−0.041 (0.44) 0.0776 (0.45) 0.182 (0.49)
Supported living and 
personal assistance 
spending effort
−0.092 (0.080) −0.107 (0.078) 0.0494 (0.085)
Ratio of state to federal 
community residential 
funding
−0.00940 (0.019) −0.00597 (0.019) −0.0513** (0.020)
Developmental disabilities 
spending effort
0.0251 (0.044) 0.0389 (0.045) 0.175*** (0.045)
Medicaid waiver spending 
effort
0.000303 (0.001) 0.000315 (0.0012) 0.00433*** (0.0012)
Percentage of states in the 
CMS region offering choice
0.700*** (0.11)
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Variables
Specification 1:  
All variables 
(standard error)
Specification 2: 
Excluding CMS region  
(standard error)
Specification 3: 
Excluding CMS  
region and year  
(standard error)
Internal variables
Democratic governor −0.0496 (0.034) −0.0300 (0.035) −0.0478 (0.037)
Election year (lagged) 0.0416 (0.034) 0.0364 (0.035) 0.0376 (0.030)
Number of Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation 
funded demonstration 
project(s)
0.0177 (0.051) 0.00650 (0.053) 0.183*** (0.048)
Number of federally funded 
demonstration projects 
0.0250 (0.011) 0.128 (0.10) 0.113 (0.12)
Cash and Counseling 
Demonstration Project
−0.1776 (0.11) −.245* (0.12) −.0587 (0.12)
R2 within = 0.3886 within = 0.3975 within = 0.1788
between = 0.0028 between = 0.0094 between = 0.0002
overall = 0.1422 overall = 0.1735 overall = 0.0326
F(11, 489) = 28.26 F(21, 479) = 15.05 F(32, 322) = 8.66
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000
Note. CMS = Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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